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In the process of the German unification and especially after the formal unification in October
1990, Eastern Germany was supported by West Germany by a lot of measures. The main
purposes were to improve the infrastructure, to stimulate private investment and to alleviate
the adjustment process for the population by transfers to private households.
The paper describes the measures in some detail. Many of these were decided upon in an ad
hoc manner, in some cases experience (partly from the period of reconstruction in West
Germany after World War II) was available. The methods of financing are described, too.
Emphasis is laid on the policy in the field of social insurance. Finally, it is tried to draw some
conclusions which might be helpful in case of a unification of South and North Korea.
JEL Classification: H 59, H 79
Keywords: Intergovernmental Relations, Debt, Social SecurityI. Measures to Support East Germany
1. The Starting Point
West Germany was in a relatively good economic position when the socialist economy of East
Germany collapsed. Economic growth had accelerated in the end of the eighties (3.5 percent
p.a. for 1987 to 1989), inflation (of about 2.5 percent) was not really a problem, employment
had increased for some years and was about one million higher than in the early eighties.
Not unrelated to this, the situation of the public sector was not at all uncomfortable. The
ratio of government expenditures to GDP had declined in the course of the eighties (Table 1),
Table I Government Expenditures
8, Taxes, Contributions to Social Security, Budget Balance










































































aNational Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), including Treuhandanstalt. —



































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1997d), Sachverstandigenrat (1996), own calculations.taxes had been cut significantly in January 1990; the public sector's budget deficit was small,
actually there was a surplus in 1989. The public sector's debt in relation to GDP was slightly
above 40 percent in 1989.
Because of the good shape of the public sector at the end of the eighties, it seemed to be
unproblematic to support East Germany (and, by the way, to share a part of the fiscal burden
of the Gulf war and to help the Russians in bringing back their soldiers living in East
Germany). This seemed to be the more the case because nearly everybody expected a strong
economic recovery of East Germany.
2. The German Economic, Monetary and Social Union (GEMSU) and the
Consequences for Fiscal Policy
The treaty on the economic, monetary and social union agreed upon in May 1990 meant an
economic capitulation of the GDR government. The "price" that East Germany had to pay for
financial support from West Germany was that a market economy had to be definitely
established. The D-Mark was to be introduced in East Germany. Fiscal policy in the East had
to be restructured in a way that is in line with a market economy, the West German rules of
the budgetary process had to be adopted by the East German government (Grossekettler
1996).
Assuming that the GDR will continue to exist, in May 1990 the GDR public sector's
borrowing requirement was limited to DM 10 billion for 1990 and to DM 14 billion for 1991
(Grossekettler 1996). In the course of 1990, the West German federal government decided that
the GDR should receive additional transfers (DM 22 billion in 1990 resp. 35 billion in 1991)
in order to be able to finance public expenditures in the East. Social insurance in the East was
subsidized by roughly DM 6 billion in the end of 1990 (BMF Finanzbericht 1992).3. Financing the Treuhandanstalt's Activities
The privatization agency Treuhandanstalt founded in March 1990 (Schmidt 1997) was
allowed to borrow in the capital market DM 7 billion in 1990 and DM 10 billion in 1991 (0.4
percent of West Germany's GDP in 1991). Some time later, the Treuhandanstalt was given the
right to raise additional capital market funds in the range of DM 25 billion and — in order to
avoid bankruptcy of the state-owned firms — to take over liabilities of the socialist firms as
well as to guarantee for private loans given to them. Finally, the Treuhandanstalt was allowed
to raise about DM 30 billion in each of the years 1992 to 1994. The financial result of the
Treuhandanstalt's activities was a liability of DM 205 billion at the end of 1994 (Table 2);
there will be an additional burden resulting from the activities of the institutions that
succeeded the Treuhandanstalt.








Interest paid to the Debt Processing Fund


















































Source: BVS (1995), Deutsche Bundesbank (various issues), Treuhandanstalt (1994).
4. Creating the German Unity Fund
In May 1990, the German Unity Fund was created. Its purpose was to transfer money to the
East in the 1990 to 1994 period for which there was not yet a system of intergovernmentaltransfers between the (rich) West and the (poor) East. The Fund received financial means
from the federal government (and the West German Lander (states) and their local authorities)
and it raised capital market funds. It ended up with liabilities close to DM 90 billion in the end
of 1994 (Table 3).
Table 3 — The "German Unity Fund': Balance of Receipts and
Expenditures




Transfers from the federal
government















































































Source: BMF Finanzbericht (1993, 1994, 1995), Statistisches
issues), Deutsche Bundesbank (various issues).
Bundesamt Fachserie 14 (various
In 1995, the Fund started to repay its debt. This is possible because the federal government
and the West German states (and their eommunalities) give away nearly DM 10 billion p.a. to
the German Unity Fund whereas the Fund's (interest) expenditures amount to only DM 7
billion per year.
5. Establishing the Debt Processing Fund
After the unification the debt of the East German government was taken over by a special
institution, the Debt Processing Fund. The fund started with a liability of DM 27 billion
(Table 4). When it stopped its work the total liabilities amounted to DM 110 billion (BMF
1997a). A large part of this debt stemmed from the introduction of the D-Mark at a conversionrate that was favorable for East Germany's citizens. This had meant that equalization claims
had to be a given to the East German banks; these claims (DM 83 billion) correspond to a
considerable share of the liabilities of the Debt Processing Fund.

























Source: BMF Finanzbericht (1995), Deutsche Bundesbank (various issues), Statistisches Bundesamt
Fachserie 14 (various issues), own calculations.
6. Introduction of the West German Fiscal Constitution in East Germany
After the unification the complete fiscal constitution of West Germany was put on East
Germany. The West German tax law had already been introduced by the treaty on the
GEMSU. As to the value added tax the GDR had agreed to introduce it as of July 1990. Thus
there were no VAT tax borders already in the mid of 1990. Until early 1991, West German
imports from East Germany were favored somewhat by reduced VAT tax rates.
7. Transfers by the Federal Government
The federal government had to share the burden given by the creation of the specific funds
mentioned. However, the direct burden was larger. It contained expenditures for social
purposes, subsidies for East German firms (including the formerly state-owned railway
system) and transfers to the East German states and local authorities. These expenditures
amounted to DM 57 billion in 1991; they nearly doubled until 1996 (Table 5). In addition.there were outlays of the federal government for reconstructing streets, harbors etc. in East
Germany.
Table 5 — Financial Transfers of the Federal Government, 1991-1996 (billion DM)
Transfers in favor of East German
- private households
-- unemploymen! aid
-- transfers in case of early retirement
-- subsidy to unemployment insurance















































































Source: Boss and Rosenschon (1996), own calculations.
8. Support from the West German States
There was direct support for East Germany from the West German states, too. States or com-
munalties in the West German sense did not exist in East Germany because of the centralized
nature of the state. These institutions were founded in 1990. A kind of refederalization took
place and an administration was built up (Grossekettler 1996: 209). Raising local taxes (land
tax e.g.) had been difficult or impossible in a region without clearly defined property rights.
The administration was rebuilt with the help of the West German Lander. Many civil servants
from the western states worked for some time in the new states' administrations (Heilemann
and Rappen 1996: 8-9). It is hardly possible to quantify the amount of the support.9. Stimulating Investment
As to the incentives for investment in East Germany it is important to look at tax reliefs (in-
cluding investment tax credits and very generous rules for depreciation allowances),
investment subsidies and interest subsidies (Table 6). Large amounts of loans with favorable
interest conditions (measured against the market interest rates) were granted by the federal
government, the European Recovery Program (ERP), the Kreditanstalt ftir Wiederaufbau and
the Deutsche Ausgleichsbank.
Table 6 — Investment Incentives for East Germany, 1990-1996 (billion DM)
Tax reliefs
- Investment tax credit
- Specific depreciation allowances
Investment subsidies
- Grants of the federal government
and the states according to the
"Gemeinschaftsaufgabe
Improving Economic Conditions"
- Transfers of the federal govern-






































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1995: 55), Deutsche Bundesbank (1996: 25), BMF (1997b) Sechzehn-
ter Subventionsberichl, DIW et al. (1997), Sachverstandigenrat (1997).
10. Support by the European Community
East Germany was integrated in the EC concept of supporting economically weak areas
already in 1991. This resulted in a DM 5 to 7 billion transfer from the EC in the years
following. Of course, this transfer was more or less financed by increased German contribu-
tions to the EC (Grossekettler 1996: 221).II. The Role of Social Insurance
1. General Remarks
The West German system of social security with its high benefit standards and its very broad
benefit spectrum was introduced very quickly in East Germany. The process started with the
agreement on the social union in July 1990 (GEMSU). Transfers in the range of DM 6 billion
were granted in the end of 1990. Finally, it became necessary to transfer large amounts of
financial means to East Germany.
The reasons are the bad labor market conditions (due to the "appreciation" of the GDR
currency as a result of GEMSU, high wages (in relation to productivity) and the decline of ex-
ports to COMECON countries) as well as certain characteristics of the pension system and the
unemployment insurance system. In addition, there were specific rules for the East (early
retirement etc.) and high pensions because of the general structure of the GDR workforce.
After the unification wages were raised drastically. The employers' associations agreed
upon wage increases significantly above the productivity increases because they intended to
get rid of competition by many East German firms, the unions agreed because the potentially
unemployed would receive high unemployment benefits which are related to (net) wages.
Pensioners were not unhappy; they gained by strongly rising pensions because pensions are
tied to the average nominal net wages, too. Another reason for raising wages sharply might
have been the fear of an accelerating migration out of East Germany (Soltwedel 1997).
Social insurance was in surplus in 1990 and 1991 favored by the unification boom.
However, as a large part of the costs of unification had been shifted to social insurance, things
changed and the rates of contributions were raised (Table 7), especially the rate for unemploy-
ment insurance increased.Table 7 — Selected Payroll Tax Rates, 1990-1996 (percent of gross wages)
Rate of contribution to
-unemployment insurance































2. Old Age Pension System
Some principles of the pension system in the West were introduced in East Germany in 1990.
In 1992, the complete West German system was tilt over East Germany. Pensions in the East
were calculated according to the West German rules; this meant that women on average
received very high pensions because of their long working lives. The pensions were raised
twice a year in order to be always close to the rapidly rising wages. During a very short time
period the standard pension doubled (Deutsche Bundesbank 1995: 23), in addition it
approached quickly the West German level (Table 8).
Table 8 — Pensions in East Germany, 1990-1996
Standard pension
8 (DM per month)
Standard pension














aIn July of the year (assuming 45 years of working life
































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1995: 23), BMA (1996, Table 7.11), VDR (various issues), own
calculations.
Facing modest revenues from contributions of the employed in the East, the consequence of
high expenditures was that substantial transfers from West Germany were needed. There are
two components: the subsidy paid by the federal government (Table 5) and the surplus of the
West German insurance system (Table 9); the latter resulted from the increase of the rate of
the payroll tax.10


















































































































































































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (various issues), own calculations.
3. Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment increased sharply in East Germany after 1990 (Table 10). This is true for
registered as well as for hidden unemployment. In the early phase of transformation short-time
work was an important issue.II .


















































































2 565 2 796





3 194 3 465
2 059 1 976




— "Registered unemployed. —
 cFinanced by
Source: Sachverstandigenrat (1994: 100; 1996: 111; 1997: Table 38), BMA (1996), own calculations.
East Germany had established a system of unemployment insurance in early 1990.
According to the treaty on the GEMSU, the system was completely adjusted to the West
German system; the systems were melt into one another already in autumn 1990.
The transfer from the West to the East resulting from the amalgamation of the systems is
considerable. It is roughly DM 18 billion for the 1991-1996 period on average (Table 11). In
addition, the federal government granted large amounts of money in order to finance
unemployment benefits etc. (Table 5).12
Table II — Budget Balance of the West and the East German Unemployment Insurance System,
1991-1996 (billion DM)
Balance in West Germany
Balance adjusted for distortions of
the imputation of contributions
Balance in East Germany
Balance adjusted for distortions of








































Source: Bundesanstalt fiir Arbeit Presseinformationen (various issues), own caluclations.










Transfers in case of early
retirement




















































































Source: Bundesanstalt fiir Arbeit Presseinformationen (various issues).Blbfiothek
13
Qualification of the unemployed was an important policy target during the transformation
process. Thus, expenditures for qualification measures (including wage subsidies) were out-
standing among the expenditures of the unemployment insurance in the East (Table 12). In
1996, they amounted to nearly 50 percent of total outlays.
4. Health Insurance
Health insurance is another important part of social insurance in Germany. The structure of
the West German system was tilt over East Germany beginning in 1991. However, the
systems are separated from each other. Thus, there is no direct transfer from the West to the
East. However, pensions as well as unemployment benefits do include a contribution to health
insurance; so the transfers from these branches of social insurance contain a (minor) transfer
element.
III. Financing West Germany's Financial Transfers to the East
When the unification process started, nobody had a clear-cut idea about the costs of unifica-
tion. So there were only limited expenditure cuts and small tax increases; the introduction of a
7.5 percent income tax surcharge was restricted to a one year period (July 1991 to June 1992).
Consequently, the public sector's deficit increased. However, the budget deficits of the federal
government, the states etc. only rose slightly, a large part of the additional debt was hidden in
specific funds including the then still state-owned railway system (Table 13).
When it became evident that the fiscal burden would be much higher than expected, taxes
were raised
1 and specific expenditures were reduced (Heilemann and Rappen 1996: 13-14).
1 There were also some tax cuts aiming at improving the investment climate in the West as well as
in the East of Germany (e.g. reduction of the corporation income tax).14






































































































































aStatistics of public finance (not NIP A). — ''Excluding Berlin. —




















Source: Deutsche Bundesbank Monatsberichte (various issues), BMF Finanzbericht (various issues),
Statistisches Bundesamt Fachserie 14, Reihe 2, Statistisches Bundesamt Fachserie 14, Reihe
3.1 (various issues), Treuhandanstalt (1994), BVS (1995), own calculations.
Nevertheless, government expenditures in relation to GDP rose in the early nineties (Table
14). The public sector's deficit in relation to GDP more than doubled after 1990; however, the
very high figures for 1992 and 1993 are strongly influenced by the recession at that time.
Corresponding to the development of the deficit figures, the public sector's debt outstanding
(in relation to GDP) rose by nearly 50 percent in the first half of the nineties. The most
important part of the additional debt of the early nineties is in the books of the specific funds
created (Table 15).15
Table 14 — Government Expenditures
8, Taxes, Contributions to Social Security, Balance and Public























































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1997a, b), Sachverstandigenrat (1996, 1997), own calculations.












State-owned housing sector of the GDR









































































































































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank Monarsberichte (various issues), Bundesministerium der Finanzen
Finanzbericht (various issues), Statistisches Bundesamt (various issues), own calculations.16
In the course of 1995, the Redemption Fund for Inherited Liabilities took over a significant
part of the debt accumulated in the process of unification (DM 336 billion). The liabilities
declined somewhat until the end of 1995 because a large part of the Bundesbank's seigniorage
gain was given to the fund; they increased again because additional debt was taken over (BMF
1997a: 2-3). The fund's interest expenditures are refunded by the federal government.
IV. Summing up: The Fiscal Burden of the Unification
The West German transfers to East Germany (net of additional revenues of the federal
government) sum up to roughly DM 1 trillion in the period 1991 to 1996 (Table 16, line V.).
They were granted mainly by the federal government, special funds and social insurance. A
small part of the transfers stems from tax reliefs which led to a shortfall of revenues (Table
16, line II.).
In 1995 and 1996, the financial transfers seem to have reached something like an
equilibrium level. Nevertheless, the transfer still amounted to about DM 141 billion in 1996,
i.e. DM 9 100 per capita (of the East German population); the relation to the West German
GDP is 4.5 percent. The transfers amounted to 34 percent of the East German GDP in 1996. In
the early nineties, they equalled more than 60 percent of the East German GDP (Table 17).
Some other comparisons might be useful in order to shed light on the level of the transfers
paid by West Germany. The interest paid on the public sector's debt was DM 130.5 billion in
1996. The general government's budget deficit (in NIPA definition) was DM 124.3 billion.
Both figures are similar to that for the transfer in 1996.17




Transfers in favor of
private households"
firms
states and local authorities
Expenditures for the infrastructure of East
Germany
0




4) German Unity Fund^
5) Debt processing fund (liabilities overtaken)
6) Treuhandanstalt
7) Transfer to the state-owned housing sector of the
GDR
8) Old age pension system of West Germany
9) Unemployment insurance of West Germany
10) Total
II. Shortfall of revenues
III. Gross financial transfer (I + II)
IV. Additional revenues of the federal government due to
unification





















aExcluding subsidies to specific funds (e.g. German Unity Fund). —











































































































Source: Boss and Rosenschon (1996), own calculations.
The support given to West Germany by the Marshall plan in the period 1948 to 1951 was
equal to about 3 percent of Germany's Gross National Product (GNP) (Heilemann and
Rappen 1996). A final comparison is helpful. Following World War I, Germany had to make
reparations in the range of 3 percent of GNP (Grossekettler 1996: 235). Seen in this way it is
astonishing that there was hardly any excitement in the (West) German public discussion of
fiscal policy in the recent years.Table 17-
18
GDP and Domestic Demand in East Germany versus Transfers from the West, 1991-1996
(billion DM)
Gross Domestic Product
Gross Domestic Product minus
net exports (consumption plus
investment)
Net exports
Transfers from West Germany
Transfers in p.c. of consumption
plus investment





































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1997a, b, c), own calculations.
Table 18 — The Structure of the Financial Transfers to East Germany, 1995 and
I. Transfers auributable to a specific purpose
Consumptive transfers
Subsidy from the West German old age pension system
Subsidy from the West German unemployment insurance
Federal government transfers to private households




Transfers from West to East German states
Subsidies from the federal government
VAT revenue shortfalls
III. Transfers (I + II)
IV. Transfers from the European Community
V. Tax revenue shortfalls due to lax reliefs




































Source: Boss and Rosenschon (1996), own calculations.
It is not possible to classify all of the transfers according to specific purposes. For many of
them it is not known how they were used. Most of the rest is not used in a productive way.19
Instead social expenditures are financed (Table 18). According to the Bundesbank, it seems to
be justified to argue that at least 40 percent of the transfers measured in an alternative way
(Bundesbank 1996) are transfers used for social policy purposes.
V. Conclusions
Seven years after the German unification it seems to be possible to draw some conclusions
from the experience. Supporting East Germany proved to be extremely expensive. One of the
reasons is the high level of unemployment (unemployment rate in October 1997: 18.2 percent;
West Germany: 9.5 percent); it cannot be explained in this paper why unemployment reached
such a high level. The other reason for the huge amount of transfers to East Germany is the
introduction of the West German welfare state in East Germany.
Both reasons should not be assessed isolated from each other. Actually, there is an intercon-
nection. The level of welfare benefits does affect the incentives to work and thus employment.
In this respect, it is important to remember that the West German system of social aid for the
poor which was introduced in the East; of course, this had its implications for employment,
too. This was the more the case because the level of the minimum income guaranteed by the
state quickly approached the West German level (Table 19). As a consequence a relatively
high minimum wage was established for the relevant labor market segment of East Germany.
This hindered the process of adjusting wages to their equilibrium levels. Unemployment
became higher than necessary. So did the transfers from West Germany.
The measures to promote investment and economic growth seem to have favored capital
intensity (Gerling 1997, Sinn 1997). So the East German labor market problem is to some
extent the consequence of the specific economic policy.20























































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1997a, b, c), BMA (1996).
Finally, the East German states apparently did receive too much money. More important:
The structure of the financial transfers did not give the correct incentives. A successful
economic policy of a state does not necessarily increase the tax revenues of that state.
However, this has been a problem in West Germany for quite a long time.21
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